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Abstract 
To increase probability of success of future nanosatellite missions, data gathered from orbit operations are of 
paramount importance, especially if anomalies are observed. E-st@r-2 Cubesat was launched on April 2016 in the 
framework of the Fly Your Satellite! programme of the European Space Agency. Few anomalies were detected 
during operation, which compromised the mission either temporary or permanently. This paper describes the 
investigation of a major anomaly that seriously affected mission operations, i.e. low Signal-to-Noise ratio of 
downlink communication. In particular, no signal could be received at the main control station. Only ground stations 
with high gain antennas and/or proper system set up could receive and decode e-st@r-2 packets, whereas standard 
radio amateur station failed. For this reason, both space and ground segments were identified to be part of the 
problem. The analysis performed to cope with the issue covered several phases of mission lifecycle, from design to 
assembly, integration and test, until operations. The investigation on the anomaly has been done by means of 
analysis and test activity. A loss of 12 to 15 dB was estimated with respect to the link budget. A fault tree analysis 
was developed to identify the failure or combination of failures that resulted in the mishap. A failure modes and 
effects analysis of communication system was carried out, as this subsystem was identified as the major contributor 
to the anomaly. In parallel, testing activity was performed on the engineering model of cubesat. A thorough test 
campaign was planned and executed at equipment, subsystem and system level. Test results on the engineering 
model were compared with orbit data and results of qualification campaign on the flight unit. The investigation 
showed that possible causes of the anomaly could be either incomplete deployment of the antenna, or incorrect 
antenna connection, or loss of power in the transceiver, or a combination of these causes amplified by the tumbling 
motion of the CubeSat. Taking into account the extensive test campaign executed on the flight unit during 
development, the failures of antenna deployment and of high-power amplifier circuit are extremely unrealistic. 
Instead, a potential defect was detected on the coaxial cable connection to the antenna, which might have caused the 
final mishap under investigation. The analysis also showed that an effective ground segment helps mitigating the 
impact of the anomaly, thus increasing mission success to a great extent, and it is worth investing more on this 
mission element. 
Keywords: Operations anomaly analysis, Cubesat in-orbit operations, Communications systems, Fault Tree analysis, 
Root causes analysis.  
 
 
Acronyms/Abbreviations 
ADCS = Attitude Determination and Control System 
AFSK = Audio Frequency Shift Keying 
AIV = Assembly Integration and Verification 
COM SYS = COMmunication SYStem 
EIRP = Effective Isotropic Radiated Power 
EM = Engineering Model 
EPS = Electrical Power System 
FM = Flight Module 
GS = Ground Station 
HPA = High Power Amplifier 
IMU = Inertial Measurement Unit 
LNA = Low Noise Amplifier 
MT = MagneTorquer 
OBC = On Board Computer 
R F= Radio Frequency 
TNC = Terminal Node Controller 
 
1. Introduction 
Until the last years, the space community identified 
CubeSats as an excellent education and training system. 
Universities around the world foresaw educational 
programs based on the development of Cubesats, 
sometimes supported by Space Agencies [1], [2]. 
In the last years, CubeSats are gaining increased 
attention within the space industry and government due 
to their essential “low cost and fast delivery” paradigm. 
The space community believes that CubeSats can 
contribute to a broad set of goals, even far off Earth [3], 
if supported by the appropriate set of technologies (i.e. 
advanced communication systems with higher data rate 
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[4], precise attitude control and navigation, and 
effective propulsion systems [5]), and increased 
reliability both at mission and system level. 
As demonstrated in [6], less than 50% of the launched 
cubesats (especially with educational purposes) 
were/are able to successfully complete their intended 
mission. Among the cubesats that sent signal to Ground 
Stations, someone reached only degraded or limited 
performances. Data gathered from orbit operations are 
of paramount importance, especially if anomalies are 
observed, for the development of future missions. 
E-st@r-II (Fig. 1) was selected within the ESA 
initiative called Fly Your Satellite! as one of the three 
cubesats launched on April 25th 2016 during a Soyuz 
launch.  
 
 
Fig. 1: E-st@r-II before integration in the P-POD 
 
E-st@r-II is still operative after the end of the 
nominal mission duration (one year). However, during 
the in-orbit operations, e-st@r-II mainly performed the 
planned mission but some anomalies were observed 
from the communication point of view, that limited the 
data collection and partially prevented to completely 
accomplish the mission. Gathered data and post-
processing analyses, documentation reviews and special 
tests permitted to investigate the origins of the 
anomalies and allowed implementing corrective actions, 
and gaining experience for future projects. 
The present paper deals with the root causes analysis 
of the communication anomalies of e-st@r-II cubesat. 
Section 2 describes the methodology, Section 3 
proposes the analysis and the related results that led to 
identifying the root causes of the anomalies, and Section 
4 highlights the importance of the analysis and traces 
some remarks and lessons learnt. 
 
2. Methodology  
The methodology followed for the e-st@r-II 
anomaly analysis takes inspiration from [8], tailoring 
the more general aspects to the case of a small-size 
space system developed at university level. 
An anomaly occurs when a system does not meet its 
requirements. A systems failure analysis is an 
investigation to determine the underlying reasons for the 
non-conformance to system requirements. A systems 
failure analysis is performed to identify non-
conformance root causes and to recommend appropriate 
corrective actions. 
 
Fig. 2: Failure Analysis Process 
 
Fig. 2 shows the approach for the analysis of the 
anomalies followed for the present case of study. This 
analysis begins with a clear understanding of the 
failures, the determination of their occurrence and 
context, and their severity. The second step is to identify 
all the sources of information such as data from real-
time or post-processed telemetry or from process 
documentation that can provide support to the analysis. 
Once this has been accomplished, all potential failure 
causes are identified using fault tree analysis. The 
process then evaluates each of the potential failure 
causes also using support analyses, including what's 
different analysis, pedigree analysis, and special tests 
and experiments. What different analysis leads to 
identify changes that might have induced the anomaly. 
The basic premise of this analysis is that the system has 
been performing satisfactorily until the failure occurred; 
therefore, something must have changed to induce the 
failure. Potential changes include system design, 
manufacturing processes, suppliers, operators, hardware 
lots, operative environment. Pedigree analysis examines 
all the documentation related to the components and 
subassemblies, all the AIV steps and results. Pedigree 
analysis involves studying this documentation (such as 
test data, inspection data, raw material data sheets, and 
other certifications) to determine if components and 
subassemblies identified in the fault tree meet the 
requirements. Special tests and experiments include tests 
designed to investigate nominal and off-nominal 
conditions on a representative model of a component, a 
subsystem or the whole system. Tests designed in 
nominal conditions serve to examine in depth special 
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features not considered during the AIV campaign. Tests 
designed inducing a failure permit to evaluate a 
hypothesized failure cause. Fault tree analysis and 
support analyses should rule out the major parts of the 
identified causes and converge on few root causes for 
each anomaly. The final step is to review (and sometimes 
relax) the requirements and/or select and implement 
corrective actions that eliminate or mitigate the anomaly. 
 
3. Analysis and results 
Est@r-II cubesat experienced communication 
anomalies during the operative life. The observed 
failures can be labelled as critical events because they 
seriously affected the mission and had a major impact 
on the mission objectives. 
During the mission, three main behaviours are 
observed: 
 orbits in which ARI-BRA ground station (GS) 
did not receive signals from the satellite but 
other stations, both radio-amateur stations 
and/or high performance stations (such as 
Dwingeloo Telescope), received signals. That 
led to review the ARI-BRA setup and to 
intensify and open new cooperation with other 
stations.  
 orbits in which radio-amateur ground stations 
did not receive signals while Big Dish Stations 
received signals. This led to investigate the 
possible causes of anomaly on the satellite 
Communication subsystem equipment (i.e 
antenna system command chain) and 
components (i.e radiomodule HPA and LNA, 
antenna pieces, transistors, cables/wires, 
connectors), in particular on the 
communication chain. 
 orbits in which no stations received signals. In 
this case, failures analysis was focused on the 
entire satellite. 
3.1 Problem definition 
From these observations, three top events have been 
identified as communication anomalies: 
1. No signal is received by Ground Station(s) 
2. Low signal to noise ratio 
3. Satellite does not execute commands 
3.2 Sources of information 
Main sources of information are: 
 telemetry data from the satellite: time from last 
reboot, voltage, current and temperature on 
solar panels and batteries, on-board power 
consumptions, angular velocities, subsystem 
status bytes 
 post processing information such as orbit 
position when packets/signals are received, 
eclipse duration and time from last eclipse 
when packet/signal is received, slant range 
when packet/signal is received, and signal 
strength: power of the signal in dB and S/N 
ratio 
 analysis of the AIV test campaign data. 
 
Table 1: event description and occurrence 
Event Description Occurrence 
No signal 
is received 
at GSs 
GSs does not 
receive signals 
from satellite for a 
period of time. 
The anomaly is 
intermittent without 
an evident periodic 
occurrence scheme. 
Low 
signal to 
noise ratio 
AFSK signal in 
input to Ground 
Station MODEM 
is too low to be 
decoded (it is 
received but not 
decoded by the 
GSs) 
Anomaly has high 
occurrence. The 
received signals are 
always lower than 
expected. Although 
the decoding 
operations are always 
possible if Big Dish 
stations receive the 
data, radio-ham 
stations (included 
ARI-BRA) seldom 
accomplish the 
validation and 
decoding process of 
the packet. 
Satellite 
does not 
execute 
commands 
Satellite does 
not react to 
commands sent by 
GSs 
This anomaly is 
intermittent but with 
high occurrence: the 
satellite rarely reacts 
to the command sent 
by ARI-BRA. 
Moreover, attempts 
to send commands 
with Big Dish Station 
dis not have 100% of 
success 
 
3.3 Fault Tree Analysis 
Fig. 3, Fig. 4, and Fig. 5 show the top parts of Fault 
Trees for the defined anomalies. 
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No signal 
reception from the 
ground station(s)
Ground Station 
failed
Inaccurate 
pointing of the 
satellite antenna 
wrt GS
No transmission 
from the satellite
B CA
 
Fig. 3: FT for the top event “No signal reception from 
the ground station(s)” 
 
 Too low
S/N ratio
too low antenna 
gain or incorrect 
radiation pattern
HPA 
failed
I
Ground station 
failed
A
 
Fig. 4: FT for the top event “Too low S/N ratio” 
 
Satellite does not 
execute command
No signal 
reception on 
satellite  
Inaccurate
 GS antenna 
pointing 
Inaccurate satellite 
antenna pointing 
Satellite antenna 
gain too low 
too low G/T ratio 
F B
G
LNA failed
TNC failed
No demodulation 
of the signal
No command 
validation and/or 
decoding
H
 
Fig. 5: FT for the top event “Satellite does not execute 
command” 
 
3.4 Support analyses 
The main differences between AIV campaign and 
the operative phase in orbit are: 
 in orbit conditions in terms of: 
o radiation environment can cause 
single event phenomena and 
progressively increases the Total 
Ionizing Dose acting on the satellite; 
o temperature of the on-board 
components can reach out of nominal 
values that temporary or permanently 
compromise their capabilities. 
 distance between Satellite and Ground Station 
that means: 
o antenna tracking for ground station 
and antenna pointing for the satellite 
were not required during AIV 
campaign 
o signal was always strong enough to 
receive and decode it during AIV 
campaign 
 long duration of the mission with respect to 
tests: all AIV campaign tests had a limited 
duration due to necessity of recharging the 
battery because solar panels could not provide 
sufficient energy in laboratory conditions: the 
maximum duration of the tests on the fully 
integrated satellite was about 12 hours. 
Similarly, tests led in HIL configuration 
present two important differences with respect 
to the mission conditions: first, the duration 
was anyway shorter (max duration: 30 hours) 
and satellite was not in the final, all integrated 
configuration. 
Pedigree analysis is based on the Acceptance Data 
Package documents and all the test reports such as HIL 
verification campaign, full functional tests in laboratory 
conditions, Mission test and Functional tests during the 
environmental tests in thermal-vacuum chamber, and 
antenna deployment verification. 
Special experiments have been designed and 
performed for the purpose of the anomaly analysis. In 
particular, 
 Tests on Radio-module Engineering Model 
(EM) output power: tests highlight that the EM 
of the BHX2 radio-module effectively 
produces 500 mW power signal. No test was 
performed for the verification of the RF output 
power of the Flight radio-module and the fully 
integrated system; 
 Test on the COM SYS EMs to verify the signal 
power in different nominal and off-nominal 
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configurations: test highlights a difference 
from 12 dB to 18 dB between signal sent with 
antenna deployed and signal with antenna not 
deployed. 
3.5 Root causes 
The “absence of signal” can be due to Ground 
station or satellite failures. Single or multiple failure(s) 
on ground station parts and/or the low performance of 
some components are considered. Mismatch 
polarization of the signal (generating a signal 
attenuation less than 0.3 dB) and the line losses between 
the antenna and transceiver (generating an estimated 
signal attenuation of less than 3 dB) cannot justify a loss 
of signal power so high to cause the complete lack of 
signal reception. An inaccurate GS antenna pointing 
provides a signal attenuation proportional to the antenna 
beamwidth and the actual misalignment of the antennas 
beams. Considering a beamwidth of 35° for the YAGI 
antenna and a maximum pointing error of 10°, the 
attenuation is about 1 dB. Neither this value justifies the 
complete lack of signal. The 2 meters, 16-elements 
YAGI antenna provide a theoretical gain of 14 dB: a 
more performant antenna can contribute to improve the 
S/N ratio but link margin computation shows that the 
link should be closed with the gain and beamwidth of 
this antenna.  
The bad pointing of the satellite antenna depends on 
the velocity of release from the P-POD, environmental 
conditions (i.e. disturbance torques), and the missed 
activation of the ADCS or a/more failure(s) of its 
components. All these conditions affect the satellite 
attitude. Data analysis of the telemetry confirms that the 
satellite maintains a slow tumbling motion. The quasi-
permanent de-activation of ADCS caused that the 
release energy from P-POD and/or the kinetics energy 
due to antenna deployment was not dumped and the 
satellite tumbles. Moreover, satellite remains under the 
disturbance torques effects without control. As a 
consequence, bad pointing of the satellite antenna 
generates a signal attenuation, determined through 
equation . Knowing that a dipole 
beamwidth is about 160°, Table 2 shows how a high 
misalignment generates a high attenuation that can both 
prevent the reception of the signal on ground (if the 
antenna has a pointing close to the zenith) or reduce 
signal strength avoiding an efficient decoding process. 
The missed reception of signal by all the ground 
station can occur when the satellite transmission is 
stopped because the activation phase is still not 
completed or one of the specific commands to stop the 
transmission are sent by the GS. The first event has not 
a negligible probability of occurrence due to the 
anomalous high number of reboots. Commands 
stopping the transmission are never activated at this 
moment so that this cause is excluded. On the contrary, 
it is possible that the satellite cannot transmit because a 
failure in the transmission chain components (such as 
antenna, HPA or TNC) occurs. It could be not excluded 
that TNC could temporary fail in hardware or in 
software. A HPA failure is hard to investigate due to the 
limited information about the design of the COTS radio-
module from the datasheets.  
 
Table 2: signal attenuation for misalignment error of the 
satellite 
Pointing error (deg) Lpr (dB) 
10 0,05 
30 0,42 
45 0,95 
60 1,68 
90 3,8 
120 6,75 
150 10,5 
 
A lack of communication between OBC and COM 
SYS can occur but is not sufficient to prevent the 
transmission. In fact, a beacon CW signal is sent unless 
one of the RF equipment fails. On the contrary, a lack of 
communication between OBC and COM SYS is 
sufficient to prevent the transmission of AFSK signals. 
A lack of transmission can occur if the satellite 
switched-off because the system buses (3.3 Volt bus, 5 
Volt bus, and battery bus) are not powered. During the 
period of time in which satellite orbits have regular 
eclipse periods, the telemetry shows nominal values of 
battery voltage. When satellite remains in daylight 
conditions for long time, the received telemetry 
confirms that the batteries work at almost maximum 
voltage. These considerations permit to exclude satellite 
switch off for batteries under-voltages. Moreover, the 
gathered EPS telemetry does not present anomalies thus 
permitting to give a low probability to the I2C node 
failure event. Temporary failure on the EPS components 
such as solar panels, battery charge regulators, voltage 
regulators, cannot be completely excluded but all the 
telemetry packets related to these components show 
nominal values and their probability of misbehaviour is 
very low. On the contrary, off-nominal operative 
temperatures on satellite components (such as batteries) 
cannot be excluded because some telemetry packets 
highlight values very close to the upper limits. High 
internal temperatures are a probable cause of the 
satellite switch-off. In this sense, tests confirm that e-
st@r-II should work properly in the operative conditions 
tested during the thermal-vacuum test campaign but we 
have no data about the behaviour of the satellite for off-
nominal thermal conditions inside the satellite. 
To conclude, the absence of received signal on 
ground is mainly due to the bad pointing of the satellite 
to nadir and the high attenuations due to bad 
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connections, and by the temporary switch-off of the 
transmissions due to the activation phase activities. To 
mitigate the ARI-BRA GS problems, some corrective 
actions were implemented such as the accurate review 
of the connections and the change of some coaxial 
cables, the change of the antenna (YAGI 3-meters long 
with 16 elements), the insertion of a circular 
polarization switch with a higher quality component, 
and the re-calibration of the antenna tracking system. 
The “low S/N ratio” is due to 1) a failure of the radio-
module, and 2) an incomplete radiation pattern and/or a 
low gain of the antenna. 
1. It is not easy to estimate the attenuation of the 
signal in case of failure of the radio-module 
from data-sheet. Theoretical computation 
shows that a reduced amplification of 10 times 
(50 mW instead of 500 mW) generates an 
attenuation of the output signal power of 10 
dB; a reduced amplification of 100 times (5 
mW) generates an attenuation of 20 dB. These 
values are compatible to explain the observed 
anomaly. Test on EM radiomodule cannot 
exclude a failure on FM. Possible causes of the 
failure are: 
 space environment: single events can have 
permanently modified the HPA settings or 
compromised other internal components. In 
this case, it seems less probable because it 
would mean that the radiation hit the 
satellite in the first 30 minutes after the 
release or during the launch phases.  
 A fault during the production phase of the 
radio-module not identified during the AIV 
campaign. However, the difficulty on the 
commands reception (see next section) 
implies the failure also of the LNA of the 
radio-module. There is low probability that 
both LNA and HPA contemporary fail 
unless the module is not correctly powered. 
2. Incomplete radiation pattern can be caused by a 
faulty connection during the integration phase: 
a wrong connection between the coaxial cable 
and the two antenna pieces. Photos taken 
during integration (Fig. 6) show that two 
twisted cables are used to lengthen the 
connection in order to ease the integration. As 
these cables are not coaxial, this configuration 
does not behave as a transmission line, instead 
these cables cause a significant loss and, as 
consequence, the antenna has not a main lobe 
but several side lobes, that fall down power 
and reduce gain and beamwidth.  
 
Fig. 6: Details of the antenna connection 
 
A second cause of incomplete antenna pattern 
and/or reduced antenna gain is a failure on the 
antenna opening circuit lines that prevents the 
antenna deployment. The antenna opening 
circuit (Fig. 7) presents a redundancy by 
design: two independent circuits (based on two 
cascades of three MOSFET) contribute to cut 
the fishing wire. This redundancy allocates a 
low probability of failure occurrence because it 
would mean that both lines failed either during 
the launch or in the first 30 minutes of the 
mission.  
 
FDV303
A
OBC
Pin 2.23
FDV303 
B
FDV304 
A
FDV304 
B
FDN359 
A
FDN359 
B
Pin 2,24
EPS Battery bus
Resistor A
Resistor B
cable
cable
 
Fig. 7: antenna openening circuit block scheme 
 
Moreover, the antenna opening procedure is 
repeated every 45 minutes in nominal 
conditions. During the development phase, 
partial antenna opening occurred due to an 
incomplete burning of the fishing wire. 
However, the defect was fixed changing the 
dimension of the wire and the duration of the 
burning time. During the final AIV campaign 
no major failures were observed on the antenna 
deployment system. However, the antenna 
deployment operations are stressful for the 
opening circuits and the continuous repetitions 
can seriously compromise the capability to cut 
the fishing wire.  
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Possible causes of missed antenna deployment 
are:  
 An incorrect closing of the antenna on 
its support so that the fishing wire 
does not touch both the resistors 
contemporary. However, the picture 
in Fig. 8 taken immediately before the 
satellite integration in the P-POD, 
should exclude this event; 
 The fishing wire was moved away 
from the resistors during the launch: 
the possibility of occurrence of this 
event could not be unwrapped.  
A third cause of failures in the antenna is the 
damage of the steel pieces. However, this event 
should be derived from a multiple failure: 
 Antenna was accidentally opened 
within the P-POD and one or both the 
pieces were torn off 
 The steel was degraded and the energy 
of the release or the launch vibrations 
caused a damage. 
These multiple failures have very low 
probability of (contemporary) occurrence. 
 
 
Fig. 8: detail of the antenna system 
 
To conclude, the bad connection between the 
antenna and the COM SYS board is considered the most 
probable cause for the difficulty to decode the AFSK 
packets because it introduces both a strong reduction of 
the EIRP and a wrong or incomplete radiation pattern 
with a smaller main lobe and higher number and strong 
side lobe. 
The “missed execution of commands” can be caused 
by the missed signal reception by the satellite, the high 
line losses attenuation between antenna and transceiver, 
the failure in TNC line, and the lack of demodulation, 
validation and/or decoding of the command. 
The bad pointing of the GS antenna that produces an 
attenuation of about 1 dB should not generate missed 
signal. On the contrary, an inaccurate pointing of the 
satellite generates a high attenuation of the signal until 
the loss of the link when the satellite antenna face points 
to zenith. Inaccurate pointing of the satellite is probable 
because no attitude control acts on the satellite until 
ADCS is activated. A failure of one or more LNA 
components cannot be identified from radio-module 
data-sheet. However, it seems less probable that both 
LNA and HPA contemporary fail unless the module is 
not correctly powered. 
A faulty connection between the coaxial cable and 
the two antenna pieces generates high line losses. Two 
twisted cables are used to lengthen the connection in 
order to ease the integration. As these cables are not 
coaxial, this configuration does not behave as a 
transmission line instead these cables cause a significant 
loss and, as consequence, antenna has not a main lobe 
but several side lobes, that fall down power and reduce 
gain and beamwidth.  
The TNC temporary failure for a SEU or a bug in 
the software should be taken into account. These failure 
causes are excluded but, according to the planned 
procedures, a command is sent only after the reception 
of an AFSK packet. It implies that TNC software works 
properly because it correctly modulates the signal. 
Moreover, although the command is not executed, the 
satellite correctly transmits another AFSK telemetry 
packet correctly after 2 minutes from the previous one, 
confirming that TNC still works. Similarly, a failure of 
the OBC or of the communication between COM SYS 
and OBC, should prevent both uplink and downlink of 
AFSK signal. Unless uplink tasks on the OBC are 
stopped, downlink tasks still work and the watchdog 
circuit does not intervene: this condition never occur 
during the development tests and the AIV campaign. 
Lack of demodulation of the signal means that the 
TNC cannot extract the base-band signal from the 
received wave. It can be due to a failure on the TNC or 
a S/N ratio value too low.  
A low antenna gain can be caused by the missed or 
partial deployment of the antenna or the steel antenna 
pieces are broken. However, both the failures have a 
low probability of occurrence thanks to redundancy of 
opening circuits. 
To conclude, the main causes of the missed 
execution of the command is ascribed to the inaccurate 
pointing of the satellite and the low value of the G/T 
ratio. This cause is mainly due to low gain of the 
antenna generated by the faulty connection of the 
antenna with the COM SYS board and/or the missed or 
partial deployment of the antenna. 
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4. Conclusions  
e-st@r-II experienced anomalies on the 
communications during the in-orbit operations. In 
particular, the signal strength is too low and sometimes 
the reception neither on ground nor on the satellite is 
possible. A root causes analysis has been performed and 
allowed to converge on few root causes: wrong cable 
connection that increases the attenuation and changes 
the radiation pattern, bad pointing of the satellite to 
nadir and, sometimes, orbit conditions (i.e. high 
temperature). 
Analysis of the anomalies of e-st@r-II mission leads 
to important considerations and remarks for future 
programmes. The design of the satellite shall foresee 
on-board redundancy and functions partitioning. The 
use of on board resources should be maximized: for 
example, the increasing number of on board micro-
processors could provide hot redundancy on vital and 
critical functions such as beacon signal transmission, 
housekeeping and mission data storage, operative 
modes management. A distributed architecture improves 
reliability with respect to the centralized architecture 
that constitutes the basic architecture implemented in e-
st@r-II, often without requiring additional hardware.  
During the assembly, integration and verification 
activity, attention shall be posed to HW interfaces 
assembly. Any connection shall be robust, and high 
quality of connectors is required; selected cables shall 
be appropriate and their length and patch shall be 
defined in order to limit interferences and losses of 
signal power, and each component shall be robustly 
fixed using screws, glues, and tapes to avoid unsafe 
movements especially during the launch phase. 
Verification campaign should be led looking for the 
reproduction of the operative conditions, for example 
using ground support equipment to stimulate the 
Cubesat through adequate models and perform HIL 
simulations as much as possible. When this kind of 
verifications is not applicable, representative tests shall 
be thought (i.e. long-distance communication that 
consists of line-of-sight communication tests between 
GS and satellite with a distance of kilometres) and the 
results properly scaled. Great importance has the 
documentation of the AIV process in terms of rigorous 
procedures definition and results recording. A planned 
sequence of simple steps facilitates setup, data 
gathering, and post processing analysis. For example, 
any step of the assembly and integration should be 
documented with pictures or sketches paying attention 
to critical details.  
Finally, Ground Segment covers an important role in 
any phase of the programme, especially during the 
operations. Often the tendency is to underestimate this 
role and the efforts, resources and time spent for ground 
station performance, setup and verification are not 
sufficient. Moreover, for educational missions, the 
support of radio-amateur network is fundamental 
because a wider coverage can be reached increasing the 
availability of the satellite signals. 
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